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JURIDICAL ORDER FUNDAMENTAL FOR PEACE
The aspirations of a war-weary world continue to crystal-
ize around the Law. All practical expressions of the hope for
permanent peace use the term lawful order, or some equiva-
lent. The distress of our times has burned into responsive
minds an acceptance of the fact that we have world-war be-
cause we did not have world-government. As the columnist
states it: "We must accept the fact that from now on, in
peace as in war, only through government can the people
think and act as a whole .... It has already been demon-
strated that governmental action is necessary for preserva-
tion of free enterprise." ' Vice President Wallace, in out-
lining "an administration pattern for the post-war world,"
says, "there will have to be an international court to make
decisions in cases of dispute." - And Pope Pius XII, in his
Christmas appeal for the "supreme dominion of God" also
acknowledged that one of the fundamental points for the
pacification of human society is a "juridical order." '
One of the most impressive considerations in favor of a
juridical order for the world is the extent to which law has
already been developed for world affairs. But it is the habit
of public thinking to disregard all this, and to conceive of
any world order as cut from whole cloth, as an entirely new
creation, and as in derogation of our national government.
It should be comforting and encouraging to provincially tim-
id minds to consider not only how much law has already been
established for the world, but how well it has worked
whenever given support, and to what extent our own gov-
ernment has recognized and enforced such law.
1 Dilworth Lupton, Cleveland Press, December, 1942. Walter Lippman, Dor-
othy Thompson, et. al., might also be cited, since their columns have almost con-
tinuously inveighed against isolationism.
2 Henry A. Wallace; radio address in commemoration of birthday of Woodrow
Wilson, Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 30, 1942.
3 Pope Pius XII: Christmas Eve Broadcast, Cleveland Press, December 24,
1942.
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The foremost examples of global jurisprudence are of
course International Law or the Law of States, Maritime
Law or Admiralty, the Law Merchant, and a development of
the latter, the Law of Negotiable Instruments. Then there
are more specific and minor examples such as the regulations
for the control of opium traffic, regulations for the control
of slave trade, rules governing commerce on international
rivers and canals, the regulations of the Universal Postal
Union, and diplomatic and consular laws.
The extent to which this world law (or International Law)
is recognized by our courts and enforced as a part of the law
of our land is readily seen by reference to our Constitution:
"The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and
equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United
States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction; to controversies ... between a state,
or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or sub-
jects." Art. III, Sec. 2, Par. 1.
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land." Art.
VI, Par. 2.
Thus we see, as was stated by Chief Justice Jay: "The
judicial power extends to all cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers, and consuls, because, as these officers
are of foreign nations, whom this nation is bound to protect
and treat according to the laws of nations, cases affecting
them ought to be cognizable only by national authority: to
all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; because, as
the seas are the joint property of nations, whose rights and
privileges relative thereto are regulated by the laws of na-
tions and treaties, such cases necessarily belong to national
jurisdiction; . .. to controversies between a state, or the
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citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects; be-
cause, as every nation is responsible for the conduct of its
citizens toward other nations, all questions touching the jus-
tice due to foreign nations or people ought to be ascertained
by and depend on national authority." '
The two chief sources of International Law (or laws of
nations, as referred to in the authority just quoted) are cus-
tom and treaties. In custom the consent of state is tacit or
implied. In treaties it is express. When treaties are made a
part of the law of our land their interpretation still depends
largely upon International Law, that field of jurisprudence
to which they belong.
It is well recognized that the common law constitutes a
fundamental part of the jurisprudence of the states of this
country,' and as such is administered by the courts of the
United States in cases of which they have jurisdiction.' It is
also well established that the Law Merchant constitutes a
part of our common law so far as applicable and not repug-
nant to our circumstances, constitutions, and statutes. The
custom of merchants throughout the world having been in-
corporated into the common law of England, became a part
of the common law of this country.7
Admiralty jurisprudence finds its sources in the ancient
law of the sea, which was the law of commercial nations gen-
erally and not that of any particular country. The procedure
of admiralty courts as now developed is essentially founded
on the civil law.' In the United States exclusive admiralty
jurisdiction is vested in the courts authorized by the Con-
stitution. The Supreme Court has held that there are bound-
aries to the maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction which
inhere in those subjects and cannot be altered by legislations,
4 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dallas, 419, 475, 1 L. Ed. 440 (1793).
5 15 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 3, p. 614; Cooley, Principles of Constitu-
tional Law, p. 8.
6 Cooley, Principles of Constitutional Law, pp. 131, 132.
7 15 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 8, p. 616.
8 2 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 2, p. 64.
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as by excluding a thing falling clearly within them, or includ-
ing a thing falling clearly without.9 Thus we see our courts
interpreting and enforcing law the international character of
which is so recognized in the basic charter of our govern-
ment that it is beyond the power of Congress to alter it.
As to International Law generally, the prevalent opinion
is that it has ceased to exist. That impression is based upon
the conduct of the Axis powers in commencing and prosecu-
ting the present war, and the failure of International Law to
prevent such conduct. Such an opinion, however, is as erro-
neous as it would be to say that there is no law in a city
which is being temporarily terrorized by gangsters. The es-
tablished principles of International Law still control rela-
tions between the United Nations and neutral nations. Even
the Axis powers have been willing to observe the law as long
as it gave them what they wanted, and they have not hesi-
tated to claim its protection when they thought it would
benefit them. The reason International Law seems to have
failed is not because there was no such law, but solely be-
cause there was no power to enforce it. The object of Inter-
national Law is not merely to prevent war, but also to reg-
ulate peaceful international relations and to regulate war
after it has broken out. Even though it failed to prevent war,
it has achieved and is still achieving a good deal of success
in the other fields. No law is concerned solely with prevent-
ing and punishing thefts and murders. Law generally is much
more concerned with the regulation of peaceable life. Just as
municipal law has prescribed and regulated the conduct of
law-abiding citizens generally in spite of robbery and mur-
der, so International Law has controlled the conduct of most
of the nations of the world in spite of war.
Law has two phases: (1) a rule of conduct which is pre-
scribed or generally observed, and (2) a rule of conduct
which is enforced in order to decide disputes, redress griev-
ances, and restrain wrongs. For realization of the second
9 Panama R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 68 L. Ed. 748 (1924).
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phase some government is necessary, a court supported by a
police force, a juridical order. Hence the recommendations
of the columnists, the Vice President, and the Pope.
The League of Nations was a noble attempt to supply the
deficiency of International Law with reference to enforce-
ment. But it too has been subjected to the indiscriminate
censure directed against International Law generally. It is
considered a total failure because it failed to prevent war.
Because it fell short of that one great purpose, the public is
inclined to overlook its very many beneficial accomplish-
ments in other fields.1" It is not even given credit for the in-
stances when it did act to prevent war. The difficulty with
preventive remedies always is that they are not appreciated,
because the evils which they forestall are never known.
The League itself prior to the present war had settled a
number of quarrels 'between states which, except for its in-
fluence, might have developed into war. In addition its Per-
manent Court of International Justice, created in 1920, had
delivered thirty judgments in international disputes. And
the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which was not super-
seded by the Court, had given twenty awards."
The reason the League of Nations was unable to prevent
the present war is that it lacked the authority to enforce its
orders for sanctions.1 Membership in the League was not
compulsory, and some nations did not belong whose support
was needed to make its orders effective. Moreover it could
not compel obedience even of its members.
The League was not given the authority and support nec-
essary to preserve world order because of prevalent errors
of thought regarding nationalism and sovereignty. The
10 Howard Robinson: Toward International Organization, p. 20 et seq.
(Harpees).
11 P. H. Winfield: The Foundations and Future of International Law, p. 11
(Cambridge University Press).
12 p. H. Winfield: The Foundations and Future of International Law, p.
109 (Cambridge University Press); See also Emery Reves: "A Democratic Mani-
festo" (Random House, New York).
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maintenance of nationality for national and local purposes
is quite proper. But international activities have expanded
to the point where they cannot be regulated by national ac-
tion or agencies. To expect to maintain international order
through nationalism, through the assertion of from sixty to
eighty different kinds of nationalistic policy, is ridiculous.
We must choose between nationalism, which leads necessar-
ily to friction and conflicts, and international organization
with a practical program for enforcement of Law, which
is our only hope for peace.
The greatest obstacle to proper international organization
has always been the assumption that nations which joined
such an organization thereby sacrificed their sovereignty.
The error of that assumption lies in the belief that the in-
dividual nation can be sovereign with reference to interna-
tional affairs. The value of sovereignty relates to internal
rights and privileges of a nation, the political, economic, so-
cial and religious rights of its citizens and the character, or-
ganization, powers and functions of its national government.
But with reference to external or international relations,
such as commerce with other nations, travel, transportation,
communication, means of exchange, war and peace, a state
or nation is not and never can be independently sovereign.
Those external interests can be managed and regulated only
by cooperation with other members of the family of na-
tions.13
The total independence which nationalism champions
means that every nation is free to do whatever it pleases.
Hence every nation must be prepared to defend itself against
all other nations. A higher degree of security would be at-
tained for each nation if certain international phases of in-
dependence were limited, regulated, and properly controlled
for the benefit of all. What James Wilson said, in recom-
mending the federal Constitution to the separate states of
18 Harry Frease: Sovereignty of Independent Nations, United Nations of
America, (Canton, Ohio).
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this nation, is now applicable to the nations of the world. He
pointed out that man in a natural state would enjoy less lib-
erty and suffer more interruption than in a regulated society.
"Hence," said he, "the universal introduction of government
of some kind or other in the social state. The liberty of every
member is increased by this introduction; for each gains
more by the limitation of the freedom of every member than
he loses by the limitation of his own. The result is that civil
government is necessary to the perfection and happiness of
man."
Our adherence to a world organization would therefore be
not so much a limiting of our national sovereignty as an ex-
tension of that law by which we now live. And, after all, the
true significance of our nation is not so much that of a place,
a bit of geography, or a flag, as it is a way of life, a way ac-
cording to the law of life. The glory of our government is
that it recognized at its inception that it was subject to law.
The settlers of our land prided themselves on the fact that
they had established a government "not of men but of laws."
And as pointed out, International Law is a definite part of
the law acknowledged in our Constitution.
The proposal for our adherence to a strengthened League
of Nations or other world organization is not therefore a
novel, strange, or chimerical suggestion. It is-in furtherance
of man's evolution and in harmony with American tradi-
tion. 4 It would be an advance toward the realization of our
social and religious aspirations and a logical and practical
development of our legal philosophy.' 5 In "A Democratic
Manifesto," Emery Reves declares that ". . . the democratic
nations must - if they wish to avoid the catastrophe of war
and preserve a measure of independence - arrive at a Dec-
14 Nicholas Murray Butler: Leadership of the United States in World Or-
ganization for Prosperity and Peace, International Conciliation, No. 371, June,
1941, and Our United States in this Backward Moving World, Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace.
15 Roscoe Pound: The Revival of Natural Law, Notre Dame Lawyer, XVII,
No. 4, June, 1942, pp. 328, 329.
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laration of Interdependence." Such Declaration, if it is to
be effective, must, of course, be supported by a council (as
recommended by the Vice President) and a court, with sub-
ordinate regional courts, and their orders and judgments re-
garding international affairs must be enforced by concerted
action. That would form a basis for juridical order.
Robert N. Wilkin.
